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Events have already dated some of the discussion in this volume.
Amendments to the federal law are pending which will extend the federal
prohibition against billboards to all signs "visible" from the highway,
and the amount of the federal financial penalty for noncompliance is to
be considerably reduced. To the reviewer's knowledge, the present
statutory penalty-ten percent of a state's federal highway
allocation-has never been invoked. Studies are also under way which
will fill prominent gaps in another vital area of advertising control: the
regulation of on-premise advertising signs. And the Highway Research
Board has sponsored detailed studies of the legal problems in
compensating for the removal of advertising signs, which are soon to be
released. Hopefully, accumulating experience and renewed interest will
yet bring us the definitive treatment of advertising regulation which the
subject clearly deserves.
DANIEL R. MANDELKER*
MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MusIc IS TO Music. By
Robert Sherrill. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Pp. 225. $6.95.
There are certain difficulties which beset a lawyer and apparently do
not beset some journalists or authors. Few lawyers have been
commercially successful even when they have desired to write for profit.
Lawyers seem to bore the normal book reading audiences with their
attention to detail and tiresome attempts to see both sides of an issue.
Even the most strenuous avocat tempers his written criticisms and
comments in a brief directed to his adversary, out of respect for the
opponent's skill and the reviewing judge's keenness. Unfortunately, Mr.
Sherrill's attention to being a commercially successful author wins out
over objectivity, fairness and accuracy.
Military Justice Is To Justice As Military Music Is To Music could
have been a fine book, which put forth some weighty theses and offered
some solutions, but, as is, it is unpalatable. The book is written in a
tabloid style with shocking statements and generalities liberally
sprinkled through its pages. Mr. Sherrill takes a position that because
we have a citizen's army, which in turn subjects millions of men to
military justice, we are destroying the fabric of our democracy by the
inadequacies of the military's system of justice. He never attempts to
* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
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prove this thesis. Rather, we are bombarded with a "parade of
horribles", which, when not inaccurate, are based upon individual cases,
any of which could have happened under any state or the federal system
of justice in this country. He concludes that the military justice system
should be destroyed and all military men be tried by state or federal
courts for their crimes.
A review of some of Mr. Sherrill's overreaching inaccuracies seems
necessary. After a number of vicious and innuendo-filled attacks upon
the Court of Military Appeals (the military's highest court) which tail
off into "guilt by association" techniques in his treatment of
appointments to the court,' Mr. Sherrill concludes that George Latimer,
a former member of the court, was "slow to see command influence"
when on the court. In fact, in 1953, long before the Military Justice Act
of 1968, the Court of Military Appeals reversed a theft conviction for
command influence in an opinion written by the same Judge Latimer, in
which he said:
The conviction and sentence in this instance are the production of a trial
not founded on those fundamental rights and privileges granted to one
tried in the military system. The accused was convicted and sentenced by a
court-martial which was not free from external influences tending to
disturb the exercise of a deliberate and unbiased judgment. The attempt to
enlighten the court members may have been prompted by the highest
ideals but the method of presentation was steeped in prejudice. 2
That does not appear to be a "slow" realization of command influence.
Sherrill makes a point of expressing outrage at the failure of the Court
of Military Appeals to follow decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. He is apparently unfamiliar with the military's role in
providing counsel for accused men long before the majority of states did
so. He also fails to mention that the Court of Military Appeals
scrupulously followed the letter and intent of Gideon and Miranda.
At another point Sherrill condemns the military system for its failure
to give out sentences with "predictability". What does Mr. Sherrill wish
predictable, the length-all predictably short or predictably long? Do we
throw out consideration of the nature of the offense, character of the
person committing it, including his past offenses, and allow a computer
1. R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO Music 213-214
(1970) [hereinafter cited as SHERRILL].
2. United States v. Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, _ 13 C.M.R. 43, 52 (1953). See also United
States v. Dubay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967) wherein many convictions were re-
manded for hearings on the extent of command influence at Port Leonard Wood, Missouri.
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to judge? If Mr. Sherrill thinks "unpredictability" of sentences is a
problem resting solely with the military, he need only examine the
workings of a federal district court in a large metropolitan area. That
would give him sufficient "disparity" of sentence per offense to satisfy
him. It would seem that Mr. Sherrill is out of touch with the maxim that
the punishment must not only fit the crime, but the criminal.
Also, he seems to draw no distinction between officers and enlisted
men in his discussions. Without discussing the philosophical (and
practical) questions of a system which creates its leaders by an act of
Congress as opposed to a vote of the men, there is a functional
difference. Two of the cases which he discusses at length involve officers
who challenged the system-Captain Levy, convicted of failure to obey
an order, and Lieutenant Howe, convicted of the use of contemptuous
words against his commander in chief and conduct unbecoming an
officer. 3 Captain Levy and Lieutenant Howe assumed some of the
responsibilities of an officer when they received their commissions as
officers, along with their assumption of the higher pay, greater privileges
and more day-to-day freedom. They were not drafted as officers, they
chose to be officers. Howe, in fact, voluntarily participated in the
Reserve Officers Training Corps in order to be an officer and at the time
of his arrest had served twelve months as an officer. 4 They accepted the
system and its privileges; they were not forced into it.
Sherrill says it is wrong for the U.S. Army to prosecute two soldiers
who made "disloyal" statements.5 He does not tell us what statements
these men were punished for, or the circumstances under which the
statements were made. As a matter of fact, he avoids it. Instead, he gives
you an excerpt from the brief of one of their attorneys which recites
generalities. The case he is discussing involved marines at Camp
Pendleton, California, awaiting transport to Viet Nam. The accused
gathered the Negro troopers in a company and advised them to go to
their commanding officer and say they would not go to Viet Nam
because it was a "white man's war" and they would "then come back
and have to fight the white man." 6 The Board of Review indicates that if
the men were simply accused of making a disloyal statement there would
be no ground for conviction, but the offense charged was making a
3 Sherrill conveniently fails to mention the offense of conduct unbecoming an officer under
Article 133, of which Lt.Howe was charged and convicted.
4. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 169,37 C.M.R. 429, (1967).
5. SHERRILL 75.
6. United States v. Harvey, N.C.M. 68-1734,40 C.M.R. 941,942 (1969).
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disloyal statement with design or interest to promote disloyalty among
the troops. Certainly the Army like any government or branch thereof
has a right to protect itself.
The listing of these inadequacies could go on and on, but such would
serve nothing now; instead, let's look at whether something constructive
can be taken from the book.
Reading carefully, we find the real thread of the problem. A military
discipline system borrowed from an ancient military empire has been
renamed "justice" and applied against an Army of conscripts and quasi-
conscripts. Quite naturally, since the mission of the military has been
limited to finding, fixing and finishing "an enemy of the country which it
serves," it channels all energies toward that goal. Some individuals in
the military system are opposed to anything which crosses that objective.
That is why the military is controlled by civilians and, hopefully, it will
remain so. By looking at extreme examples of individuals who have not
understood or tolerated true justice in the military, Sherrill condemns
the whole system. This is best typified by the jacket of the book which
depicts a three star general with the face of a pig-a definitely unfair and
unprofessional generality.
Mr. Sherrill does point out the fact that the military has been
attempting for years to reform itself. These reforms were last brought
forth in the Military Justice Act of 1968. The items of reform in the
amendment take much of the thrust from Mr. Sherrill's arguments as
they concerned right to counsel and command influence.
Mr. Sherrill would have been better disposed to expend his energies
not in calling for the complete destruction of a system because of
individual faults, but to give us some ideas to protect the serviceman
within the framework of the system. His approach to solving the military
justice "problem" would be analogous to the shifting of all state judicial
functions to the federal judiciary after the Supreme Court decided
Powell v. Alabama,7 because of one state's improper procedures. Not
only would it be harmful to the function of the States, but overload and
probably destroy the federal criminal justice system.
I think the reader of Sherrill's book could ask if it be far more logical
and less destructive to make the system of military justice as determined
by the Congress of the United States and administered by the military,
subject to direct review by the federal judiciary. Hopefully, this review
would be upon application of the serviceman at the federal district court
7. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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level either before or after conviction. This would not only have a
deterrent effect upon those military leaders who are totally onesighted in
their goal, or mission, but would give a meaningful "double" review of
actions of military courts. Certainly it would be no more time
consuming or expensive than attempting to include the 3,000,000 plus
men in our military all within the federal system for common law,
statutory and military crimes.
HOWARD T. BRINTON*
THE NEW DRAFT LAW: A MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND COUNSELORS.
Edited by Ann Fagan Ginger. National Lawyer's Guild: Berkeley, 1970.
Pp. 240. $10.00.
The highlight of this book is the back cover which depicts a realistic
game for beating the system, whether one intends to delay his induction,
obtain a deferment, obtain an exemption (more specifically,
conscientious objection), win a criminal trial for refusing to perform a
duty imposed by the Selective Service System, or win release or
discharge once one is inducted.
This pictorial maze becomes a headnote for the material which relates
in layman's language how to present one's case before the draft board
and how to obtain the administrative review, such as it is, prior to
indictment. For the discussion of the lawyer's involvement in pre-
induction review of a classification, the defense of a criminal action, the
obtaining of a habeas corpus for release of an inductee, and the court
martial proceedings, Mrs. Ginger's material changes to legal and more
technical language.
Mrs. Ginger's simplicity in language is an imperative for the
registrant and his lay counselor, for the Selective Service System
specifically denies the right to counsel during its administrative
adjudications. The book reflects the editor's compassion and concern by
detailing for the registrant the nature of prison life for one who must
serve a sentence. This is of extreme importance since the decision to defy
the Selective Service System must incorporate the possibility of a prison
term. (In St. Louis, for example, everyone has been sentenced to five
years with the exception of two Jehovah's Witnesses).
The minor problems that the editor has with her material relate to a
' Member, Illinois Bar.
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